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Abstract-Cache coherence plays a major role in manycore 
systems. The verification of deadlocks is a challenge in par­
ticular, because deadlock freedom is an emergent property. 
Formal methods often decouple verification of the protocol 
from verification of the communication interconnect. Modern 
communication fabrics, however, become more advanced and 
include a network topology, routing, arbitration, synchro­
nization, and more. In this paper, an integrated approach 
is proposed that allows cross-layer verification of both the 
cache coherence protocol and the communication fabric all 
at once. An automated methodology for deriving cross-layer 
invariants is proposed. These invariants relate the state of 
the application-layer protocols to en route packets in the 
communication fabric. We apply this methodology in a case 
study where cross-layer deadlocks occur if queues are wrongly 
sized. Our methodology is generally applicable and shows 
promising scalability. 
1. Introduction 
One of the major challenges in the design and verifica­
tion of manycore systems is cache coherence. In the context 
of bus-based architectures or point-to-point networks, this 
problem has been subject to heavy research and a large 
number of solutions exist. When replacing such architec­
tures with an interconnection network, however, many new 
problems arise. Efficient, correct and deadlock-free solutions 
for cache coherence in such manycore systems are still an 
open problem. 
Often, formal verification of cache coherence analyzes 
the communication fabric independently from the proto­
col [1]. For example, a key characteristic of a bus-based 
architecture is that bus access requests are serialized by 
some arbitration logic. It is therefor assumed that modelling 
the communication on the bus can be done using, e.g., 
synchronous handshaking semantics [2]. However, when 
the cores are connected using an interconnection network, 
this assumption is no longer valid. Injected packets can 
be en route while the cores are active, possibly inducing 
contention, message reordering (e.g., in case of adaptive 
routing), etc. Deadlocks may emerge from a deadlock-free 
coherence protocol and a deadlock-free interconnect, e.g., 
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when queue sizes are too small. Discovering these kinds of 
deadlocks requires an integrated approach. 
This paper proposes ADVOCAT (Automated Deadlock 
Verification for On-chip Cache coherence and InTercon­
nects). An integrated approach, that combines a common 
way of modelling cache coherence protocols (i.e., 10 state 
automata) with an effective way of modelling communica­
tion fabrics (i.e., XMAS models introduced by Intel). This 
allows cross-layer verification. Our methodology provides 
cross-layer invariants, which formulate relations between 
the states of the protocols and the packets en route in the 
communication fabric. Using these invariants, we prove the 
absence of cross-layer deadlocks. 
Our methodology is sound, but subject to false negatives. 
A "deadlock-free" result ensures a deadlock-free system, but 
if a deadlock is found it might be unreachable. Section 5 
presents an extensive case study. In this case-study any dis­
covered deadlock is actually reachable, which is confirmed 
using UPPAAL for small versions of the networks. We show 
that these deadlocks cannot be resolved by using virtual 
channels. Instead, deadlock freedom depends on the queue 
sizes and thus we use our methodology to find the smallest 
possible queue size. 
Running Example. Consider Figure 1. Two automata S 
and T are connected via a trivial communication fabric 
consisting of two queues. The left automaton injects requests 
and consumes acknowledgments, the right automaton the 
other way around. When ignoring the communication fabric 
and considering the composition obtained by synchronous 
handshaking [2], the two automata are deadlock-free. The 
composed system is either in state (80, to) or (81, h), and 
in both states there is an enabled transition. 
e ack? req! 81 S qo ql e ack! req? tl T 
Figure 1. Two state automata connected by XMAS queues. The exclamation 
(question) mark represents sending (receiving) of a packet. 
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When considering the system and the communication 
fabric integrally, the proof of deadlock freedom becomes 
harder. State (S1' to) now is reachable. This state might be 
a deadlock, e.g., when the communication fabric is empty. 
This deadlock however is unreachable since whenever the 
automata are in state (S1' to), there is either a request en 
route from S to T or an acknowledgment from T to S. 
Invariants are needed to rule out these unreachable dead­
locks. The invariant that is found automatically by our 
methodology is: 
This invariant is cross-layer, stating a relation between the 
states of the automata and the contents of the queues in the 
communication fabric. Variables T.to and S.so have numeric 
values that are 1 (0) if and only if the automaton is (not) in 
that state. The invariant shows that there is no backpressure 
in the fabric, since there is at most one packet in both 
queues. For that to happen, the automata must be in state 
(S1' to). Since we know that S.so + S.S1 = 1 (and the same 
for T), this invariant also shows that if the automata are not 
in state ( S1' to), the communication fabric is empty. Finally, 
it also says that state (so, t1) is unreachable: in that case 
the left hand side of the equation would be -1, whereas the 
right hand side is always a natural number. This invariant is 
sufficiently strong to rule out any unreachable deadlock. 
2. XMAS and 10 Automata 
An XMAS model is a network of primitives connected 
via channels. A channel connects an initiator primitive to 
a target primitive. Each channel consists of three signals. 
Channel signal c. irdy is high when the initiator is ready to 
write to channel c. Channel signal c. trdy indicates if the 
target is ready to read channel c. Channel signal c. data 
contains data that is transferred from the initiator output to 
the target input if and only if both signals c. irdy and c. trdy 
are high. 
The language XMAS provides eight basic primitives. 
A queue stores packets. A function primitive manipulates 
data. Its parameter is a function that produces an outgo­
ing packet from an incoming packet. Messages are non­
deterministically produced and consumed at sources and 
sinks. A source may process multiple message types. We 
assume sources are fair, i.e., they will always eventually 
be ready to transmit. Sinks are assumed to be either fair 
or dead. A fork duplicates an incoming packet to its two 
outputs. Such a transfer takes place if and only if the input 
is ready to send and the two outputs are both ready to read. 
A join copies data from input a to its output, but such a 
transfer only takes place if the other input is ready to send 
as well. A switch uses its function parameter to determine 
towards which output an incoming packet must be routed. A 
merge is an arbiter. It grants its output to one of its inputs. 
We assume that merges are fair, e.g., round-robin or FIFO. 
For more explanation, we refer to [3]. 
XMAS Automata. To integrate 10 automata with XMAS, 
they require an XMAS interface, i.e., they need to read from 
and write to channels consisting of trdy, irdy and data sig­
nals. An automaton can have multiple in-channels, allowing, 
e.g., to consume packets sent by the communication fabric 
and packets sent by the core. Similarly, it may also have 
multiple out-channels. The edges are labelled with an event 
and a transformation. An event is a function c that takes as 
input an in-channel i and a packet d. It returns true if the 
automaton is ready to consume the packet. A transformation 
is a function cp that takes as input an in-channel i and a 
packet d. It returns a tuple (0, d') representing the emission 
of packet d' at channel o. It also may return -.1, indicating 
that no packet is produced by the transition. 
Definition 1. Let D denote the type of packets. An XMAS 
automaton is a tuple (S,T,so,CJ,Co) with S the set 
of states, T the set of transitions, So the initial state and 
CJ (Co) the set of in (out) channels. A transition t E T 
is a tuple (s, Sf, c, cp) with sand s' the begin and end 
states, function c :: CJ X D f-7 an event and function 
cp :: CJ x D f-7 (Co x D) + 1 a transformation. 
Semantics. The semantics of XMAS primitives are defined 
by equations denoting their effect on the irdy and data 
signals of its out-channels and the trdy of its in-channel. We 
formulate these equations for XMAS automata. Whether a 
packet is consumed or produced by an XMAS automaton 
depends on whether transitions are enabled. 
Definition 2. Let A be an XMAS automaton and let A.s 
denote that automaton A is in state s. A transition t = 
(s, s', c, cp) of XMAS automaton A is enabled for in­
channel i, notation enabled(t, i) , if and only if: 
bl d( . ) def A . . d ena e t,z = .sAz.zr yA 
c(i, i.data) A rdy(cp(i, i.data)) 
where rdy(-.1) = Tr ue, rdy(o, d') = o.tr dy 
A transition is enabled if and only if the automaton is in 
the right state, and channel i is ready to transmit a packet 
that triggers the event and can be forwarded to an output (if 
applicable). 
At all times, multiple transitions can be enabled, i.e., 
there can be multiple in-channels that contain packets which 
can be consumed. We assume the existence of a fair se­
lection function selA that chooses an enabled transition 
and the corresponding in-channel. The semantics of XMAS 
automaton A are defined as follows (the underscore matches 
any value): 
i.trdy := selA = (i,_) 
o.irdy := selA = (i, t) A cp(i, i.data) = (0,_) 
o.data := selA = (i, t) A cp(i, i.data) = (o,d') ? d' : -.1 
where t = (s, s', c, cp) 
The automaton is ready to receive a packet from in-channel 
i if it is selected, and thus there exists some enabled transi­
tion consuming a packet from i. The automaton is ready 
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to transmit a packet on out-channel 0 if it has selected 
some transition t whose transformation produces a packet at 
channel o. The data produced by the automaton is set only 
when a transition has been selected. In that case, it takes 
the value as dictated by the transformation. In other cases, 
it will have default value ..i. 
3. Deadlock Detection 
Gotmanov et al. propose a deadlock detection technique 
for XMAS networks based on block and idle equations [3]. 
This technique reduces the the problem of finding a deadlock 
to an SMT instance. A channel is permanently blocked (idle) 
if its trdy (irdy) signal is permanently low. For example, the 
block of an input of a fork is defined as the block of its 
output and the idle of the other input. Let d be a packet and 
let q be a queue. The block (idle) of the in (out) channel of 
queue q are defined as: 
block(q.in,d) = #q = q.size 1\ 
:3d'ET(q.OUt) . block(q.out, d') 
idle(q.out, d) = #q.req = 01\ idle(q.in, req) 
Here, function T takes as input a channel and returns an 
overapproximation of the packets that can possibly be in 
that channel. We will use the term colors for this, in the 
same fashion as colored Petri nets. The block equation 
states that a request is blocked if and only if the number 
of packets in the queue is equal to its size and if there 
exists a packet (occupying the head of the queue) that is 
permanently stuck. The idle equation states that the channel 
is idle for requests if and only if there are no requests in 
the queue and additionally a request will never arrive. 
We define block and idle equations for XMAS automata. 
To this end, we first define an equation formulating when an 
XMAS automaton is in a deadlock. This equation introduces 
a new type of variable of the form A.s. This variable is either 
o or 1 depending on whether automaton A is in state s. 
An automaton A can be in a deadlock if there exists 
a state for which all outgoing transitions can be dead, 
i.e., permanently not enabled. Whether a transition is dead 
depends on the packets at the in-channels of the automaton. 
Consider, for sake of simplicity, an event s that is only true 
for packet d at in-channel i. Let (0, d') be the result of the 
transformation. The transition is dead if and only if channel 
o is permanently unable to accept packet d', or if packet d 
will never arrive at channel i at all. The first case can be 
formulated as the block of 0 for d'. The second case as the 
idle of i for d. This yields the following equation: 
deadA(A) = :3s . A.s 1\ Vt=(s,S',€,<p)" 
Vi' VdET(i)" 
s(i, d) -+ (block(<p(i, d)) V idle(i, d)) 
where block(..1) = False 
When a packet arrives at the in-channel of an XMAS 
automaton, it can be permanently blocked because the au­
tomaton is in a deadlock. It is also possible that the automa­
ton simply does not accept the packet at all. Similarly, an 
out-channel is idle for some packet if the automaton is in a 
deadlock or if the automaton never produces the packet in 
the first place. The block and idle equations for an XMAS 
automaton are therefore: 
block( i, d) = (Vt=(s,s' ,€,<p) . ..., s( i, d)) V deadA 
idle( 0, d') = (Vt=(s,s' ,€,<p) . Vi . V dET(i)" 
s(i, d) -+ <p(i, d) -=I (0, d'))  V deadA 
An unfolding of these equations yields an overapprox­
imation of the possible deadlocks. When applied to the 
running example, this yields two deadlock candidates. First, 
when the queues are empty and the automata are in state 
(Sl' to) . Secondly, when qo is filled with reqs, q1 is filled 
with acks and the automata are in state (so, t1) ' Both 
deadlocks are unreachable and are ruled out by the invariant 
presented in Section 1. 
4. Deriving Invariants 
Chatterjee and Kishinevsky propose a method for gen­
erating inductive invariants over XMAS fabrics [4]. Their 
method is based on the notion of flows. Consider, e.g., 
the flow of packets d passing through a queue q with in­
channel i and out-channel o. The technique of Chatterjee 
and Kishinevsky is based on the intuition that the number 
of times packets of color d pass through channel i is always 
equal to the number of times packets of color d pass through 
channel 0 minus the number of packets d that are stored in 
the queue. More formally, let >..1 denote the number of clock 
ticks in which i.ir dy 1\ i.tr dy 1\ i.data = d. Moreover, let 
#q.d denote the number of d-colored packets in queue q. 
Then the following is invariably true: >..1 = >..� - #q.d. 
For each primitive, an invariant is defined. For example, 
a fork induces the following invariant: >..1 = >..� = >..g. These 
invariants form a matrix. This matrix is reduced to row ech­
elon form using Gaussian Elimination. All >..-variables are 
swept away, yielding invariants solely concerning relations 
between the number of packets in queues. 
We extend the methodology of Chatterjee and 
Kishinevsky by adding invariants for XMAS automata. This 
requires additional variables. First, variables of the form 
A.s, with A an automaton and s a state, are integer variables 
with value 0 or 1. Secondly, we introduce variables of the 
form K;� . Here, A is an automaton and t is a transition. 
Variable K;� represents the number of times transition t has 
fired, i.e., the number of times that selA = C, t). 
The first invariant simply states that all automata A are 
in exactly one state, i.e., L:sES A.s = 1. 
Let A be an automaton and s a state. The second 
invariant relates the number of times the ingoing transitions 
of s fire to the number of times the outgoing transitions 
of s fire. Consider the case where automata A is not in 
state s. Each time an ingoing transition has fired must have 
been matched by the firing of one outgoing transition. If 
automata A is in state s, the same holds up to the firing of 
one outgoing transition. This holds for any state, except for 
the initial state. Thus, the following invariant holds (proofs 
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of soundness of the invariants are straightforward and have 
been left out due to space restriction): 
L K;� = ( L K;�) + A.s - (s = so) (1) 
Example 1. Consider automaton 8 of the system in Fig­
ure 1. For sake of presentation, we use #req! and 
#ack? instead of K;-variables, to denote the number 
of times these transitions fired. Equation 1 induces 
the following equations: #req! = #ack? + 8.s1 and 
#ack? = #req! + 8.so - l. 
The third invariant relates the number of times packets 
arrive at in-channels of automaton A to the number of times 
transitions fire. To this end, we consider the set I of all 
tuples (i, d), with i an in-channel of A and d E T ( i) a 
color of that channel. We partition this set in such a way 
that whenever two tuples can both enable some transition t, 
they are put in the same subset. Let rv denote the equivalence 
relation induced by the partition. Then the following holds 
for all tuples: 
(::Jt=(s,s' ,E,<p) . E( i, d) /\ E( i', d')) ===} (i, d) rv (i', d') 
Different partitions satisfying this criterion exist, but there 
is exactly one partition that is the most fine-grained, i.e., 
that contains the largest number of subsets. Let I� denote 
that partition. Let I E I� be one of the subsets, i.e., a set 
of tuples of in-channels with colors. Each tuple can enable 
one or more transitions. The set of transitions enabled by 
set I is defined as: 
T (I) � {(S,S',E,cp) I ::J(i,d)EI 'E(i,d)} 
Let (i, d) E I be a tuple. Whenever a packet d flows through 
in-channel i, one of the transitions in T (I) fires. The third 
invariant states that for any equivalence class I: 
(2) 
(i,d)EI tET(I) 
The number of times packets flow through one of the in­
channels in subset I is equal to the number of times a 
transition fires that can be enabled by one of the in-channels 
in I. 
Example 2. Consider again automaton 8 in Figure 1. It has 
two in-channels, each of which has only one color. Thus, 
I = {(src.out, token), (q1.out, ack)}. This set is parti­
tioned into two equivalence classes, since each enables 
a different transition. The first enables the transition 
injecting requests. The second enables the transition con­
suming acks. Equation 2 therefore induces the following 
t· . \ token - # ' d \ ack - # k? equa IOns. Asrc.out req. an Aq1.out ac . .  
Finally, a fourth invariant relates the number of times 
packets are produced at the out-channels of automaton A 
to the number of times transitions fire. This is very similar 
to Equation 2, but instead of partitioning in-channels based 
on whether they can enable the same transitions, we par­
tition tuples (0, d') of out-channels and packets based on 
whether they share transitions that can produce packet d' at 
channelo. 
We add these equations to the matrix, sweeping K;­
variables away while keeping A.s variables. This yields 
invariants relating states of the automata to the contents of 
the queues in the communication fabric. 
5. Case Study 
We present a case-study that includes a cross-layer 
deadlock. In the example, we put an abstract version of a 
directory-based MI protocol on a 2D mesh with XY routing. 
We assume store-and-forward switching, so that a queue 
with queue size n is able to store n complete packets. For 
the sake of presentation, we have initially omitted as much 
as possible, such as data transfer, cache-to-cache forwarding, 
nacks and virtual channels (VCs). We also present a version 
including all these facets. We assume there is exactly one 
directory and will vary its position. 
The resulting protocol has been proven deadlock-free 
for bus-based or point-to-point communication using UP­
PAAL. A 2D mesh with XY routing is well-known to be 
deadlock-free. The composition, however, may have dead­
locks, regardless of the use of virtual channels. We show 
that deadlock freedom depends on whether the queue sizes 
are "sufficiently large". Whether they are sufficiently large 
depends on both size of the mesh and the location of the 
directory. 
Figure 2 shows the protocol. On a load or store miss, 
the cache sends out a get signal to access a block of cache 
(data or instruction). When it gets an invalidate from the 
directory or when a replacement is triggered from the core 
itself, it flushes the block of cache and notifies the directory 
via a put. Then, it goes to intermediate state MI to wait 
for an acknowledgment. The directory waits for a get to go 
from I to M and stores the cache that owns the block. The 
M and MI states are thus parameterized with the owner c. 
The directory may decide at any time to send an invalidate 
to the owner. Whenever it receives a put from that cache, it 
will return to its initial state. When a packet can currently 





(a) L2 cache (b) Directory 
Figure 2. Artificial protocol 
Figure 3 describes a cross-layer deadlock in a 2 x 2-
mesh with all queue sizes equal to 2. Cache (0,0) has sent 
consecutively a get and a put to the directory. The directory, 
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being in a state where cache (1,0) owns the block, cannot 
accept these as it is waiting for the space to inject an inv 
destined for (1,0). However, the queue leading to that cache 
is already filled with such invs. Cache (1,0) cannot accept 
an inv, since in order to accept it, it must inject a put. 
Figure 3. Cross-layer deadlock 
If the queue sizes would have been 3 or more, the system 
is deadlock-free. First, note that due to XY routing, the 
packets occupying qs can only be emitted from either (0,0) 
or (1,0). Secondly, a cache can only once emit a get/put 
before it gets stuck in its MI-state waiting for an ack of the 
directory. Thus, in the deadlock in Figure 3, if qs would have 
had a third space, that space would not be occupied by any 
packet from (0,0). Therefore, cache (1,0) now is able to 
consume an inv and emit a put. Then, the get/put of cache 
(0,0) in qs would be stalled and the new put from (1,0) 
would overtake them; the deadlock is resolved. Figure 4 
shows the queue sizes necessary for deadlock freedom for 
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29 29 29 29 29 
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Figure 4. Queue sizes found by ADVOCAT for different mesh sizes and 
directory positions. For example. in a 4 x 4-mesh, when the directory is 
at (1,1), queue sizes have to be at least 15. 
Experimental Results. Consider a 2 x 2-mesh where the 
directory d is at the lower-right node. The following invari­
ants are found automatically. They concern the left-upper 
cache (0,0), here denoted with c: 
1 = qE.getX(c) + qs.getX(c) + 
qN.ack(c) +qw.ack(c) + 
c.I + d.M(c) + d.MI (c) (3) 
d.MI(c) = qE.putX(c) + qs.putX(c) + 
qN.ack(c) +qN.ack(c) (4) 
The first invariant shows that whenever a getX is en route 
from the cache to the directory, there is no corresponding 
ack en route, and the other way around. Whenever either a 
getX or an ack is en route, the cache cannot be in state I 
and the directory cannot be in a state where cache c already 
owns the cache. Moreover, there can be at most one getX or 
one ack en route (but not both at the same time). When the 
cache is in state I or when the directory is in a state where 
cache c owns the block, no getX or ack is en route at all. 
Finally, it cannot be the case that the cache is in its I-state, 
while the directory is in a state where the cache owns the 
block of data. 
The second invariant shows that there is either a putX 
or an ack en route, if and only if the directory is in state 
MI and cache c owns the block of data. Similar invariants 
are found for the other caches, yielding 6 invariants in total 
for three caches. These invariants are sufficient for proving 
deadlock freedom. 
A common approach to resolve deadlocks is to add vir­
tual channels for different message types [5]. The deadlock 
as described above, however, cannot be resolved this way. 
The use of VCs does allow for smaller queue size. For 
example, a 6 x 6-mesh is deadlock-free for VC-sizes of 
greater than 29; without VCs the queues have to be of size 
58. 
A total verification effort - including T-derivation, in­
variant generation, and a proof of deadlock freedom - for a 
6 x 6-mesh with VCs and queue size 30 takes 67 seconds I. 
This example includes 2844 primitives, 36 automata and 432 
queues. Note that the verification time of our algorithm does 
not depend on the queue size. 
MI Protocol. We have adopted a version of the MI cache 
coherence protocol inspired on the version modelled using 
the GEM5 simulator [6]. This cache coherence protocol sup­
ports cache-to-cache transfer and includes the modelling of 
DMA accesses. It has been modified to exclude the deadlock 
described above. The communication of acking/nacking a 
replacement and the notification upon receiving data are 
added. The L2 cache model contains 5 states, the directory 
4+n (with n the number of caches) and there are 8 different 
types of messages, each parameterized with destination and 
source nodes. 
In a 2x2 setting, 14 invariants are found, of varying 
complexity. An example of an invariant is that when all 
automata are in their I state, there are no en route acks, no en 
route forwarded requests and no replacements. As another 
example, let C denote the set of caches, let d denote the 
directory and let linvsl ( Iacksl) denote the number of en 
route invs and acks respectively. The following invariant is 
found: 
L c.MI - d.MI = lacksl - linvsl 
cEC 
Consider the case where the directory is in state MI but no 
cache is. There must be exactly one en route inv. When 
this is consumed, one cache goes to its MI state, meaning 
that the LHS equates to O. This implies that at that point no 
acks or invs are en route. 
1. All results have been obtained on a 2 GHz Intel Core i7. with 4GB of 
memory. All source code, UPPAAL models and case studies can be found 
online at: www.cs.ru.nV�freekver/DATEI6/ 
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We have verified this protocol for all meshes up to 5 x 5. 
When queue sizes are too small and a cross-layer deadlock 
occurs, this is found in 32 minutes for a 5 x 5-mesh. A proof 
of deadlock freedom takes 56 minutes. 
6. Related Work 
Formal methods have played an important role in the 
design and verification of cache coherence protocols [7]. 
Various formal verification methodologies target cache co­
herence, using, e.g., Murphi [8], [9], SMV [ 10], [ 11], or pro­
tocol message flow charts [ 12]. German provided the Ger­
man protocol as a challenge for parametric and automated 
verification [ 13]. Chou et al. present a semi-automated 
method for parametric verification based on model checking 
and a form of assume-guarantee reasoning [ 14]. Generally, 
however, these works decouple verification of the intercon­
nect from verification of the protocol. They often assume a 
bus-based architecture or networks with VCs for all message 
types. 
Zhang et al. derive informal design guidelines that en­
sure that parametric verification is possible [ 15]. These 
guidelines state, e.g., that all the nodes should be identical 
and that queue sizes should be independent of the number 
of nodes. Our methodology requires no adherence to such 
guidelines, at the price of not being parametric in the number 
of nodes. 
The problem of cache coherence verification on the 
architectural level has been addressed in [ 16]. That approach 
uses the existing regular XMAS primitives to model cache 
coherence protocols. This requires manual, cumbersome and 
error-prone modelling. It is, e.g., hard to model snooping 
behavior using the existing XMAS primitives. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper targets cross-layer verification, by combining 
10 state automata for modelling application-level protocols 
with XMAS primitives for fine-grained modelling of com­
munication fabrics. A methodology for deriving cross-layer 
invariants has been implemented. These invariants are used 
to prove absence of protocol-level, network-level and cross­
layer deadlocks. The whole methodology, coined ADVOCAT, 
is fully automatic. It is generally applicable to commu­
nication fabrics that include routing, virtual channels (or 
not), arbitration, broadcasting, adaptive routing, etc. It can 
deal with both directory-based and snoopy cache coherence 
protocols. Our methodology is sound but subject to false 
negatives. 
We applied ADVOCAT to an extensive case-study, where 
cross-layer deadlocks are possible when queue sizes are too 
small. ADVOCAT was used to derive the minimally possible 
queue sizes, which depend both on protocol- and fabric­
related facets (the routing algorithm, the size of the mesh). 
Challenging future work consists of the derivation of 
invariants that provide information on the order of arrival 
of en route packets. This will lead to more accurate and 
informative feedback in case deadlocks are found and can 
also decrease the number of false negatives. In the near 
future, we aim to distill 10 automata models from GEM5 
descriptions. Eventually, we aim to have a fully automated 
formal verification approach directly applicable to GEM5 
cache coherence system architectures. 
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